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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is causing the Arctic ice to melt and fish stocks to 
change their migration patterns.1 These changes are increasing access to 
Arctic fisheries, as well as moving other fish stocks to the north.2 To pre-
vent the depletion of fish stocks and to protect the Arctic environment, 
proper fisheries governance requires collaboration between nation-states 
and specific populations—such as the aboriginals, who are uniquely af-
fected by changes in fish stocks—in designing and implementing fisher-
ies management. Governing fisheries presents unique management issues. 
Fish stocks, unlike other natural resources, do not stay in the same 
place—fish are constantly moving and may even travel thousands of 
miles to mate or lay eggs. The non-stationary nature of fish stocks, along 
with shared sovereignty over the oceans, make coordination between 
stakeholders the most difficult as well as the most important component 
of any fisheries governance structure. 
Different approaches have been employed to manage and protect 
fisheries, to varying degrees of success: privatization, sector-based man-
agement, and ecosystem-based management. At the same time, different 
governance structures have been established to effectuate these manage-
ment approaches: Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
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(RFMOs), hierarchical structures, and co-governance. Based on the need 
to protect aboriginals’ economic and social interests in effective fisheries 
management, an Arctic-RFMO must be created and work with countries 
to co-govern the fisheries located within the Arctic. 
This paper will explore three frameworks for fisheries governance: 
(1) the Interactive Governance Approach (IGA); (2) the Ecosystems Ap-
proach to Fisheries (EAF); and (3) the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (RFMO). Any governance structure must respect the exist-
ing rights of remote aboriginal communities in Alaska’s Arctic as well as 
protect their livelihood. This paper argues that an RFMO for the Arctic is 
necessary to provide a forum in which Arctic nations can coordinate their 
policies and collectively address the challenges that face the region. An 
effective Arctic-RFMO will bring about compliance with international 
treaties (e.g., the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement) and encourage a co-governance ap-
proach to Arctic fisheries management. Such a governance structure will 
ensure that fisheries are properly protected and that the interests of peo-
ples whose livelihood depends on fisheries will be adequately represent-
ed. 
II. THE ARCTIC AND FISHERIES GOVERNANCE 
Until recently, the Arctic remained one of the least travelled to are-
as of our environment.3 While the Arctic is one of the world’s most frag-
ile ecosystems, it lacks a robust system of governance to manage the re-
gion. Climate change has triggered drastic changes in the Arctic, includ-
ing a reduction in the surface area of ice and a change in fish migratory 
patterns. Presently, the international community is ill prepared to manage 
and adapt.4 The current system of governance is insufficient to handle the 
effects climate change has had upon the Arctic. Therefore, to effectively 
manage Arctic fisheries in light of climate change, an Arctic-focused 
Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) must be created. 
The Arctic presents a unique opportunity to improve the model for 
fisheries management. As a result of global warming and pollution, 40% 
of formerly frozen water in the Arctic Ocean is now open sea.5 Further-
more, global climate change has drastically affected the migratory pat-
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terns of fish. Many fish stocks have migrated much further north, chang-
ing the make-up of local fish stocks.6 Scientists have been able to use the 
migration of fish to track ocean change.7 At least one recent study has 
statistically confirmed that the most likely cause of many of the mass 
migrations taking place in the oceans is climate change, rather than ocean 
pollution or overfishing.8 By better understanding changing fish migra-
tion patterns, we can improve market-based approaches to include con-
siderations of the geographical location of fish in addition to managing 
the amount of fish caught. 
As fish migrate further north, fishers are likely to follow. When in-
dividual fishers do push north, they will likely argue they have a right to 
access these fish, and may even have valid claims under the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation.9 International commercial fishing interests will 
also be incentivized to push north in order to protect their industry. The 
net effect of more vessels pushing north is an increased strain upon the 
Arctic environment as a result of their presence. The effects global 
warming and pollution are having upon the Arctic suggest major short-
comings with the current approach to Arctic management.10 
Fisheries management requires a solution beyond the borders of 
any individual nation-states—fisheries must be managed at the interna-
tional level.11 There are several international legal instruments and vol-
untary, proto-regulatory bodies that cover states and individuals acting in 
the Arctic.12 However, there is no model that effectively and cohesively 
manages the Arctic fisheries. Market-based approaches in the form of 
catch shares or individual transfer quotas (ITQ)13  have proven to be 
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 13. ITQs are a management system based in market-based economic theory. The conceptual 
idea is that each individual fisher who holds an ITQ receives a set share of the total amount of catch 
(Total Allowable Catch or TAC). The theory is that the ITQ system provides an opportunity for each 
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largely reactive given that these shares and quotas are determined based 
on what has already happened.14 Implementing regulations and analyzing 
collected data have proven to be a protracted processes, which means 
there is a significant lag time between the identification of a problem and 
the development and implementation of a solution. A new system of 
fisheries management can avoid depletion of Arctic stocks by preventing 
the destruction of the delicate ecosystems and social systems of aborigi-
nal peoples in the Arctic.15 With the well-being of society, economic sta-
bility, and food security on the line, it is imperative that we properly 
manage the Arctic. 
A. Interactive Governance Approach 
The Interactive Governance Approach (IGA) addresses the chal-
lenges facing fisheries by facilitating collaboration between participants. 
Fisheries managers battle competing interests in an effort to protect eco-
system health, social justice, livelihoods, and food security.16 
The complexity and dynamic nature of the system must be met with 
an equally complex and dynamic approach.17 Thus, the IGA seeks to ad-
dress diversity through inclusiveness; complexity through rational, holis-
tic, integrative approaches; and dynamics through an interactive and 
adaptive framework. The IGA emphasizes interactive, evolving partner-
ship building as the solution to fishery management. This leads to co-
governance, but requires governing bodies to move away from historical-
ly hierarchical management of fisheries. 
“Governability” is a key criterion of IGA. This quality is situated 
partly in the system to be governed (SG), the small-scale fisheries (SSF) 
chain, and in the fisheries community; partly in the governing system 
(GS)—the institutions and organizations that have a leadership role in 
SSF; and partly in the governing interactions (GI)—how the GS and the 
SG are linked and communicate.18 The inherent traits and constructed 
capabilities of all three systems are what make a fishery more or less 
                                                                                                                            
individual to realize the future value of the fishery stock through a perceived guarantee of future 
earnings. This helps to ensure compliance with government regulations. 
 14. See generally Jason Konefal, Environmental Movements, Market-Based Approaches, and 
Neoliberalization: A Case Study of the Sustainable Seafood Movement, 26 ORG. & ENV’T 336 
(2012). 
 15. J. F. Caddy, Fisheries Management in the Twenty-First Century: Will New Paradigms 
Apply?, 9 REVIEWS IN FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 1, 38 (1999). 
 16. Svein Jentoft, Limits of Governability: Institutional Implications for Fisheries and Coastal 
Governance, 31 MARINE POL’Y 360, 362–67 (2007). 
 17. Id. 
 18. MAARTEN BAVINCK ET AL., CTR. FOR MAR. RES., INTERACTIVE FISHERIES GOVERNANCE: 
A GUIDE TO BETTER PRACTICE 45–46 (2005), available at http://www.marecentre.nl/fishgovfood/ 
documents/bavinck_interactive.pdf. 
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governable. The more capable the governing system, the more agreeable 
the system to be governed, and the more effective the tools by which the 
governing system uses to steer, the higher the overall quality of govern-
ance—i.e., the higher the governability. 
Fisheries management is shifting from a largely hierarchical model 
to a system of co-governance.19 A complete shift to a system of co-
governance will provide many opportunities for affected countries to be 
fully engaged and interactive in fisheries management. The IGA identi-
fies three distinct governance models: (1) self-governance; (2) co-
governance; and (3) hierarchical governance.20 These three models offer 
different levels of governability. 
B. Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management 
The function of an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) is to plan, 
develop, and manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the multiple 
needs and desires of societies without jeopardizing the options for future 
generations to benefit from the full range of goods and services provided 
by the same marine ecosystems.21 A key criterion of the EAF is the pre-
cautionary approach; the underlying assumption is that the systems in-
volved are inherently complex and difficult to understand.22 The EAF 
relies on the need for sound science, adaptation to changing conditions, 
partnerships with diverse stakeholders and organizations, and a long-term 
commitment to the welfare of both the ecosystem and human societies. 
Fishing activities affect the ecosystem beyond the fisheries by catching 
non-targeted species, damaging habitats, interrupting the food chain, and 
reducing biodiversity.23 Responsible fisheries management must consider 
the impact of fisheries on the ecosystem as a whole. The objective of the 
EAF is to guarantee the sustainable use of the whole system, as opposed 
to effectuate measures with narrow purposes and effect. 
The EAF is based on a number of principles that have been ex-
pressed in international instruments and conventions, particularly the 
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ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISHERIES 11 (2003), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/ 
y4470e/y4470e00.pdf. 
 22. Tim Lauck et al., Implementing the Precautionary Principle in Fisheries Management 
Through Marine Reserves at S72–S78, ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS (1998), available at 
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CO%3B2. 
 23. Id. 
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Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF).24 These principles 
support the high-level policy goals of fishery management at a national 
or regional scale. The main principles associated with the CCRF are: 
1. fisheries should be managed to limit their impact on the ecosys-
tem to the extent possible;25 
2. ecological relationships between harvested, dependent, and as-
sociated species should be maintained;26 
3. management measures should be compatible across the entire 
distribution of the resource (across jurisdictions and manage-
ment plans);27 
4. the precautionary approach should be applied because 
knowledge on ecosystems is incomplete;28 and 
5. governance should ensure both human and ecosystem well-
being and equity.29 
 
Ultimately, the EAF endeavors to create long-term sustainable fish-
eries within the larger ecosystem. The EAF is a new approach to fisheries 
management that brings together a broad range of disciplines to achieve 
the goal of continued ecosystem health. The principles set forth in the 
CCRF provide direction that can help preserve the tenuous balance be-
tween fishery efficiency and ecosystem health. 
The EAF advocates operation of SSFs, instead of large-scale indus-
trial fisheries, in order to best protect delicate Arctic ecosystems. SSFs 
are incentivized to fish in such a way that will preserve their local fish 
stocks because they are smaller, more disparate, and more identifiable. 
Total catch quotas, along with individual fishing quotas (IFQs), can also 
help to maintain healthy fish stocks while ensuring that fishers can run 
productive businesses. Because SSFs incentivize the protection of local 
fish stocks, aboriginals’ livelihoods would be better protected. 
Fisheries are more than just a source of food and income; they form 
a way of life that can be traced back centuries. The loss of fisheries 
would have a devastating effect on aboriginal and coastal communities 
                                                        
 24 . See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO TECHNICAL 
GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES 2: PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO CAPTURE FISHERIES 
AND SPECIES INTRODUCTIONS (1996) [hereinafter FAO PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH], available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/003/W3592e/W3592e00.pdf.  
 25. Id. at 10, 21. 
 26. Id. at 34. 
 27. Id. at 6, 9. 
 28. Id. at 8. 
 29. Id. at 9. 
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whose way of life is tied to fisheries.30 The industrialization of fishing 
has marginalized SSFs. SSFs cannot compete with large-scale fisheries 
and are disadvantaged by their failure to comply with fisheries regula-
tions. 
1. Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) Guidelines 
Encouraging the operation of SSFs would compliment aboriginals’ 
lifestyles and deep connection to fisheries. SSFs are those fisheries 
where the fishers who utilize them are either individuals or small opera-
tions.31 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines SSFs as 
those fisheries that are either artisanal or very limited in their scale.32 The 
FAO includes in their operating definition the difference between small-
scale fisheries in different regions around the world.33 Members of an 
SSF are often either self-employed or employed by a close family mem-
ber, engage in fishing seasonally, and have their activities aimed at 
providing direct food for their family or an income for their immediate 
family.34 
The FAO recently adopted a series of voluntary guidelines for 
SSFs.35 These guidelines were written to foster the development and en-
hancement of SSFs and artisanal fisheries, and to address the confluence 
of food security, societal and economic well-being, and cultural identi-
ty.36 These guidelines aim to protect human rights and set forth best prac-
tices for fishery development that secure the environment. 
SSFs are located at the peripheries of society, marginalized through 
their physical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural remoteness from 
urban centers.37 While SSFs could be the mechanism by which commu-
                                                        
 30 . GORDON R. MUNRO ET AL., ECONOMIC & ANALYSIS BRANCH (CAN.), IMPACTS OF 
HARVESTING RIGHTS IN CANADIAN PACIFIC FISHERIES 6–13 (2009), available at 
http://fisheries.ubc.ca/sites/fisheries.ubc.ca/files/uploads/m.bailey/pubs/Reports/Munro_etal_Harvest
ingRightsN01-3.pdf. See also Dietmar Grimm et al., Assessing Catch Shares’ Effects: Evidence from 
Federal United States and Associated British Columbian Fisheries, 36 MARINE POL’Y 644, 654–57 
(2012). 
 31. See generally FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR SECURING SUSTAINABLE SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES (2012), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/Fi/DOCUMENT/ssf/SSF_guidelines/ZeroDraftSSFGuidelines_MAY2012.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 27. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See generally Daniel Pauly, Small-Scale Fisheries in the Tropics: Marginality, Marginali-
zation, and Some Implications for Fisheries Management, in GLOBAL TRENDS: FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT 40 (E. K. Pikitch et al. eds., 1997), available at http://www.seaaroundus.org/ 
researcher/dpauly/PDF/1997/Books&Chapters/SmallScaleFisheriesTropicsMarginality 
MarginalizationSome%20Imp.pdf. 
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nities overcome poverty, these fishers are typically plagued by poverty.38 
The FAO guiding principles intend to protect cultural diversity and em-
power SSFs to be successful, and not at the expense of the environment. 
The aboriginal communities throughout the Arctic stand to benefit from 
implementing these guidelines. The EAF and FAO small-scale fisheries 
guidelines are written to protect human rights and ensure responsible 
fishing. 
2. Sectoral Fisheries Management 
The sectoral approach to fisheries management insufficiently pro-
tects the ecosystem.39 Sectoral management divides the fishery into sec-
tors based on, for example, species of fish.40 This approach does not al-
low for the consideration of ecological characteristics. Some experts go 
so far as to suggest that the system of “[s]ectoral (fisheries) management 
is antithetical to ecosystem-based management.”41 This system generates 
an expectation among fishers that they have rights to the fishery, even 
though a sectoral management regime does not allocate rights to fish-
ers.42 
Additionally, sectoral management makes it relatively simple for 
commercial interests to resist management.43 This also creates a situation 
where commercial interests can obfuscate the situation as a result of the 
limitations of the approach through lobbying efforts. There has not been 
significant research done on this dilemma, but it remains a potential issue 
that may exist given the pervasiveness of lobbying efforts.44 A sectoral 
management approach fails to include an analysis of processing facilities 
and their effect upon the ecosystem as a whole.45 This results in an in-
                                                        
 38. Christophe Béné & Richard M. Friend, Poverty in Small-Scale Fisheries: Old Issue, New 
Analysis, 11 PROGRESS DEV. STUD. 119, 120, 129 (2011). 
 39. See generally A. David McGuire et al., Sensitivity of the Carbon Cycle in the Arctic to 
Climate Change, 79 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 523 (2009). 
 40 . See, e.g., Northeast Multispecies, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://www.nero.noaa.gov/sfd/sfdmultisector.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 41. Lori Ridgeway, Dir. Gen., Int’l Policy and Integration for Fisheries & Oceans (Can.), 
Presentation, Issues in Arctic Fisheries Governance: Some Canadian Perspectives, available at 
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Ridgeway-arctic-fisheries.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 42. See generally Adam Soliman, Do Private Property Rights Promote Sustainability? Exam-
ining Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries, 4 SEATTLE J. OF ENVTL. L. (forthcoming May 
2014). 
 43. M. Estellie Smith, Chaos in Fisheries Management, 3 MAR. ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUD. 1, 
9 (1990). 
 44. See, e.g., Hui Chen, David Parsley & Ya-wen Yang, Corporate Lobbying and Financial 
Performance (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014264. 
 45. See Scott Matulich et al., Toward a More Complete Model of Individual Transferable Fish-
ing Quotas: Implications of Incorporating the Processing Sector, 31 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 
112 (1996). 
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complete model of the effects of utilizing sectoral management, which 
research has further suggested undermines the attempt at accomplishing 
the end goals of fisheries management. 
In comparison to the ecosystem-based approach, the sectoral ap-
proach has significant flaws. First, it fails to account for fishing’s impact 
on other species or the entire system by managing the fishery on a spe-
cies-by-species basis. Addressing fishery management on a species-by-
species basis can lead to drastic imbalances between predator and prey 
species, causing significant harm to the ecosystem. The ecosystem oper-
ates as a whole to create an environment that will sustain fish. Species-
by-species fisheries management is oversimplified, and as a result fails to 
adequately protect the ecosystem as a whole. 
Second, decisions are made based on an economic-focused defini-
tion of “efficiency” with little consideration of other benefits for properly 
managing fisheries. The sectoral approach’s economically focused defi-
nition of efficiency fails to account for the needs of aboriginal communi-
ties. Economic efficiency should not be the only goal of fisheries man-
agement. Fisheries can provide entire communities with a source of in-
come. Therefore, employing fewer people to deliver the same output in 
order to achieve lean, economic efficiency may be equally as damaging 
to developing communities as industrial overfishing and the consequenc-
es of poor fishery management. People displaced from fishing jobs will 
have tremendous difficulty finding new employment, thrusting develop-
ing countries in particular into greater hardship. In such a situation, the 
economic efficiency that sectoral management usually delivers may be, 
on balance, a negative rather than positive outcome. 
These communities are also negatively affected by the marginaliza-
tion of small-scale fisheries. Sectoral management has the effect of con-
centrating control and fish availability (i.e. quotas) in the hands of a few 
firms. As a result, small-scale fisheries are pushed out, further concen-
trating ownership in larger industries as the sectoral licenses are bought 
up by these industrial fishing operations.46 Reducing the likelihood that 
small-scale fisheries can survive or promoting economic efficiency in 
fishery management could have significant social and political effects. 
Fishers who are deemed “inefficient” may not have the skills to find oth-
er employment. Without jobs, these fishers are then unable to care for 
themselves and their families, potentially drawing them to less savory 
employment (e.g., drug trade, human trafficking, etc.). Some perceive a 
moral duty to enable certain types of individuals or entities to continue to 
                                                        
 46. Dietmar Grimm et al., Assessing Catch Shares’ Effects: Evidence from Federal United 
States and Associated British Columbian Fisheries, 36 MARINE POL’Y 644, 654–57 (2012). 
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work as independent fishers, regardless of any economic inefficiency. 
The justification for this position is often hidden within an argument that 
explicitly claims to be based on social costs. Bromley, for example, asks: 
“Are individual fishing firms—many of them family firms—nothing but 
pieces of capital to be used or banished as government fisheries manag-
ers seek to ‘maximize profit for the fleet’?”47 The moral implication is 
that “family” firms deserve the opportunity to fish more than others do. 
This moral reasoning is based upon the concept that while industrial fish-
ing aims to maximize profit and efficiency, it often does so at the ex-
pense of entire communities of fishers who rely on fishing as a way of 
life. Therefore, while allocating fish and requiring fishers to obtain per-
mits in part protects fish species, it does not protect communities which 
exist for the purpose of employing and feeding their people; rather, it 
protects the interests of profit-maximizing commercial fishermen. 
Other theorists hold that monopolistic or oligopolistic industry 
structures should per se not be allowed. These arguments are usually 
based on one of two reasons: (1) monopolists and oligopolists wield so 
much power that they can force other market participants to accept prices 
or other terms that those other participants would not voluntarily agree to; 
and, (2) a market that contains several small firms is inherently better. 
The latter point is the position of one of the major schools of antitrust 
theory in the United States, which holds that “[t]hroughout the history of 
[antitrust] statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their pur-
poses was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of 
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effec-
tively compete with each other.”48 
In addition to being more focused on profit maximization, sectoral 
management clashes with the precautionary approach in two ways. The 
FAO defines the precautionary principle as follows: “Management ac-
cording to the precautionary approach exercises prudent foresight to 
avoid unacceptable or undesirable situations, taking into account that 
changes in fisheries systems are only slowly reversible, difficult to con-
trol, not well understood, and subject to change in the environment and 
human values.”49 This regime can facilitate the rapid adoption of fishing 
techniques which are highly efficient for catching one or a few species, 
but which may have serious and long-lasting impacts on the ecosystem 
as a whole. Bottom trawling, especially in sensitive environments such as 
coral reefs, is an example of such a technique. Regimes that allow for 
                                                        
 47. Daniel Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fisheries Policy, 34 FISHERIES 
280, 286 (2009), available at http://www.aae.wisc.edu/dbromley/pdfs/fisheriesifq.pdf. 
 48. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 49. FAO PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH, supra note 24, at 8. 
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fishing on a species-by-species basis may be ill-equipped to consider the 
impact on other species or the ecosystem because they are looking at 
fisheries management through the lens of one fish species rather than 
through the lens of the ecosystem as a whole. 
Judicial decisions upholding the sectoral management approach 
have had the effect of creating strong property rights for license holders 
and preventing regulators from taking necessary precautionary actions. 
For example, when the New Zealand government attempted to reduce the 
total catch for the northern red snapper (Centroberyx affinis) to allow the 
stock to rebuild, fishers filed injunctions to either prevent the reductions 
or force the government to provide compensation.50 Furthermore, coun-
tries with access to the Arctic have provided limited legal protection to 
aboriginal communities’ rights to fish.51 For example, the Canadian Con-
stitution protects the rights of aboriginals to fish in the Arctic based on 
fishing claims made prior to the European settlement of Canada.52 Unfor-
tunately, while their fishing rights are protected, their knowledge and 
wisdom of fisheries management goes untapped.53  Similarly, Norway 
recognizes the rights of the Saami as an aboriginal group to continue 
fishing as a part of their tradition, but has placed restrictions on their 
right via regulations.54 The United States also has a program that protects 
the rights of aboriginal groups, but does not fully consult them regarding 
fishery management.55 
The EAF approach is the most compatible management approach to 
the RFMO framework; together they best address the challenges current-
ly facing fisheries. Given the wide range of regions within each RFMO, 
the ecosystem approach best addresses the complex system spanning the 
ocean. The challenge will be in practically applying these systems at the 
                                                        
 50. See generally Catherine Wallace, Tradeable Quota in Practice: Decision Making, Institu-
tions and Outcomes—the New Zealand Experience Over 11 Years, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH 
INT’L CONFERENCE OF THE INT’L INST. OF FISHERIES ECON. & TRADE 639 (A. Eide & Terje Vassdal 
eds., 1998). 
 51. Including the United States, Canada, Norway, and arguably Russia. See, e.g., Constitution 
Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K). 
 52. Id. See also R. v. Marshall (No. 1), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (Can.); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 
2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.). 
 53. Martin S. Weinstein, Pieces of the Puzzle: Solutions for Community-Based Fisheries Man-
agement from Native Canadians, Japanese Cooperatives, and Common Property Researchers, 12 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 407 (1998). 
 54. See generally United Nations Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report on Indigenous 
Fishing Rights in the Seas with Case Studies from Australia and Norway, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2010/2 
(Jan. 8, 2010). 
 55. See generally Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 
ARIZ. J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 47 (2010). 
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same time. Many RFMOs face challenges with coordinating nations’ 
opinions.56 
3. Current Arctic Resource Regulation 
The current legal regime in the Arctic consists of U.N. treaties. The 
treaties bind parties to certain standards applicable to the entire sea, in-
cluding setting a maximum level of allowable pollution per vessel.57 The 
RFMO has also successfully enacted and enforced non-binding, volun-
tary standards.58 
The Arctic fishery is, despite the fears that some groups hold, not 
commercially exploited at this time.59 Instead, aboriginal people from the 
five coastal states that border the Arctic—Norway, the Russian Federa-
tion, the United States of America, Greenland, and Canada—largely uti-
lize them.60 Current governance approaches are geared toward managing 
the use by these aboriginal tribes, and not commercial fishing vessels. 
Without a cohesive, enforceable international treaty, fishing by commer-
cial vessels will be insufficiently regulated when commercial fishing be-
gins.61 
Norway, Russia, the United States, Greenland, and Canada are 
members of a variety of international organizations aimed at protecting 
the Arctic, yet an Arctic RFMO has not been established.62 These states 
seem to agree that some sort of international agreement is necessary, but 
disagree as to the terms.63 Their inability to collaborate has resulted in 
inaction.64 
As a result of the impasse, these five states have agreed that the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission’s (NEAFC) mandate will pro-
                                                        
 56. See generally Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna Fisheries: Arrangements, 
Challenges, and a Way Forward (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper No. 536, 2010), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1453e/i1453e00.pdf. 
 57. Berkman & Young, supra note 12, at 340. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Russell Sticklor & Brendan McGovern, Eyes on Yet Another Prize in the Arctic 
Ocean: Fisheries at the Top of the World, STIMSON (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.stimson.org/ 
spotlight/eyes-on-yet-another-prize-in-the-arctic-ocean-fisheries-at-the-top-of-the-world; Ben 
Shingler, Arctic Fishing: Scientists Call for Moratorium On Commercial Fishing in Arctic Waters, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 22, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/04/22/arctic-
fishing-scientists_n_1444313.html. 
 60. OCEANS NORTH CANADA, supra note 5. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Including the Arctic Council, the relevant U.N. treaties, and others. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 63. See INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE, MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEXITY: REGIME INTERPLAY & GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 143 (Sebastian Oberthür 
& Olav Schram Stokke eds., 2007). 
 64. Id. 
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tect the Arctic fisheries when commercial fishing begins, and that no 
other RFMO is necessary at this time.65 This paper contends that the 
NEAFC is insufficient to manage the Arctic, and that developing control-
ling measures after commercial fishing has started will endanger fisher-
ies. 
Some countries have made independent efforts to manage fishing in 
the Arctic. Though the United States has not ratified UNCLOS,66 the 
United States has established fisheries management groups aimed at en-
suring sustainable use of the Northern resources under the Magnuson–
Stevens Act. 67  This includes the “Arctic Fishery Management Plan,” 
which proposes closing the Bering Strait to commercial fishing until the 
viability of fishing in the Strait can be scientifically supported.68 Norway, 
by contrast, has taken the view that the existing body of international law, 
including UNCLOS, provides a sufficient framework for managing fish-
eries.69 
Russia’s compliance with international laws controlling fishing is 
inconsistent at best. Many laws appear to be largely ignored. For instance, 
two thirds of the Russian fishing fleet does not meet Russian safety 
standards,70 and a variety of unpermitted fishers illegally fish and export 
their catch to other nations.71 Whether this is a result of apathy, or an 
unwillingness to be subjected to international principles, Russia does not 
properly manage their fishing activities. 
III. REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
RFMOs are comprehensive international bodies designed to coor-
dinate nations’ management of fisheries and address the migratory nature 
of fish stocks.72 RFMOs provide states a forum to discuss individual 
                                                        
 65. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Chairman’s Statement at Meeting on 
Future Arctic Fisheries (May 1, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/pr/2013/ 
209176.htm. 
 66. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [here-
inafter UNCLOS]. 
 67. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1884 (2007). 
 68. See generally Arctic Fishery Management Plan, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www. 
oceansnorth.org/arctic-fishery-management-plan (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 69. See generally Erik Lahnstein, Managing the Arctic—Norway’s Views, ARCTIC FORUM 
FOUNDATION, http://eu-arctic-forum.org/publications/managing-the-arctic-%E2%80%93-norway 
%E2%80%99s-views/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 70. V. Zilanov, Fish Under Law?, 22 RUSSIA TODAY 54, 54–55 (Adam Soliman trans., 2001) 
(on file with author). 
 71. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL FISHERY SECTOR OVERVIEW: 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2007), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/fcp/en/ 
FI_CP_RU.pdf. 
 72. MICHAEL W. LODGE ET AL., CHATHAM HOUSE, RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES FOR 
REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.chatham 
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management of fisheries and coordinate joint efforts.73 RFMOs, as crea-
tures of voluntary international agreements, cannot issue binding regula-
tions.74 They have successfully served as a system by which to discuss 
the best methodology for managing regional fish stocks, but have not 
been able to coordinate a response to migrating stocks.75 
There are three issues that arise due to the voluntary nature of 
RFMO membership.76 First, not all actors with interests in the governed 
fisheries become members of an RFMO.77 As a result, the fishery is 
shared between both members and non-members of the RFMO.78 Second, 
members can pick and choose the terms of the RFMO agreement with 
which they will comply.79 Third, in order to improve the chances that 
members will comply with the agreement terms, quotas are set at levels 
much higher than those advised by scientists.80 
A. Failure to Realize Collaborative Governance 
To effectuate proper fishery management, coastal nation-states 
must collaborate in their efforts to design and implement rules regarding 
fisheries’ operations. Recent studies illustrate that devolving fishery 
management from state governments to local communities is beneficial.81 
Local communities are better positioned to review previous and current 
fisheries operations and design better-suited regulations. They are also 
incentivized to take action that protects fisheries, rather than action that 
simply maximizes profit, because their livelihoods are so dependent on 
fishing. 
Fisheries are a fundamental and traditional way of life for many 
communities. State-imposed governance models can generate tension 
because while the governance model may have certain positive effects on 
fisheries operations, it often ignores the cultural and social importance 
that fishing plays in these coastal communities. For example, governance 
models often fail to take tradition into account. Fishing is a skill passed 
from generation to generation. As a result, habits are informed by experi-
                                                                                                                            
house.org/publications/papers/view/108602. 
 73. Id. at 18. 
 74. Id. at ix. 
 75. See, e.g., Sarika Cullis-Suzuki & Daniel Pauly, Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation 
of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1036 (2010). 
 76. Pedro Pintassilgo et al., Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organi-
zations, 46 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 377, 378 (2010). 
 77. Id. at 386. 
 78. Id. at 378. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id at 379. 
 81. See generally Caddy, supra note 15. 
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ence and tradition rather than scientific studies.82 Governance structures 
should encourage the development of management approaches that uti-
lize both science and tradition to preserve fishing resources. 
Aboriginal societies have a tremendous amount of knowledge that 
should be drawn on. For aboriginal societies, the fishery is not merely a 
source of economic value, but also a source of identity and a body of cul-
tural knowledge.83 Many of the fishers in the Arctic are subsistence- 
based and aboriginal.84 Studies suggest that aboriginal knowledge is ro-
bust, and can offer better adaptive solutions to migratory patterns than 
solutions based simply on scientific data.85 Aboriginals tend to be more 
conservative than scientific models, which have consistently not erred on 
the side of caution and have consequently led to overfishing.86 Scientific 
models are imperfect because they fail to comprehensively understand 
the interconnected nature of fisheries.87 Consequently, any error in scien-
tific conclusions upon which fisheries regulations are based can lead to 
overfishing. 
The Arctic aboriginal societies and coastal waters span the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, Canada, the Russian Federation, Denmark (on 
behalf of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway, and Swe-
den. The NEAFC has great potential to improve the management of Arc-
tic waters, but key Arctic nations are not parties to the NEAFC, including 
the United States and Canada. As non-parties, they are not required to 
participate in the development of measures nor implement the recom-
mended measures. Therefore, it is unclear the impact that the NEAFC 
RFMO is having on fishery protection. 
Each country has its own structure by which to manage fisheries 
and each vary widely in the frequency by which they report fisheries-
related data. Zeller et al. conducted a comprehensive overview of the 
FAO area, reviewing eighteen catches between 1950 and 2006.88 The 
                                                        
 82. See generally JAN KOOIMAN ET AL., FISH FOR LIFE: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE FOR 
FISHERIES (Jan Kooiman et al. eds., 2005). 
 83 . GLENN SIGURDSON, BARRY STUART & JESSICA BRATTY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
COLLABORATIVE FISHERIES GOVERNANCE 3 (2011), available at http://www.glennsigurdson.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2011/04/guidebook_FNL.pdf. 
 84. Ridgeway, supra note 41. 
 85. See R.E. Johannes, M.M.R. Freeman, & R.J. Hamilton, Ignore Fishers’ Knowledge and 
Miss the Boat, 1 FISH & FISHERIES 257 (2000). 
 86. See generally Konefal, supra note 14. 
 87. See, e.g., Jeremy B. C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of 
Coastal Ecosystems, 293 SCI. 629 (2001), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/293/ 
5530/629.full.pdf; Overfishing, Presentation to Fisheries Science Class at Iowa State University, 
http://www.nrem.iastate.edu/class/assets/aecl520/PowerPoint%20Presentations/Overfishing.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2014);. 
 88. See generally D. Zeller et al., Arctic Fisheries Catches in Russia, USA, and Canada: Base-
lines For Neglected Ecosystems, 34 POLAR BIOL. 955 (2011), available at 
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FAO area includes shores and seas in the Arctic associated with the 
United States, Canada, and Russia. Among other things, the Zeller over-
view indicates that most reports of Arctic catches to the FAO come only 
from Russia, and in general the total amount of fish caught is massively 
underreported to the FAO.89 
Russia has the largest Arctic coastal territory, spanning four seas—
the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, and part of the 
Chukchi Sea. The Zeller study reports on catch data from the Russian 
authorities such as the State Institute of Lake and River Fisheries 
(GOSNIORKH), which manages SSFs, and the National Administration 
for Fishery Enforcement, Resource Restoration, and Fishing Regulation 
(GLAVRYBVOD), which manages commercial and industrial fishing.90 
The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, a federal agency 
branched in Alaska, oversees implementation of federal regulation of 
commercial and subsistence fisheries, while the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game (ADF&G) oversees programs of subsistence fishing, 
which is the usual form SSFs take in Alaska’s Arctic communities.91 
ADF&G also oversees commercial fishing, and the Zeller study reported 
Kotzebue Sound to be the hub of marine commercial fishing for chum 
salmon.92 
In Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada—a federal agency control-
ling both commercial and small-scale fishing—oversees the fisheries.93 
The Zeller study reports on fifty-one fishery communities that subsist 
from the vast coastal Arctic waters belonging to the country.94 
Countries’ individual efforts to manage their fisheries have been 
unsuccessful. Establishing an Arctic-dedicated RFMO is imperative to 
protecting the Arctic fisheries. Countries with a greater capacity to ex-
ploit fisheries, such as the United States and Russia, resist management 
structures that will limit their catch limits and the area in which they can 
fish. Furthermore, these countries have poor track records with respect to 
reporting. If countries were parties to an Arctic-dedicated RFMO, they 






 89. Id. at 955. 
 90. Id. at 958. 
 91. Id. at 963. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 959. 
 94. Id. These communities are inhabited by a majority of Inuit people, with some Algonquian, 
Athapaskan, Métis people, as well as non-indigenous people in the coastal areas of Hudson Bay. Id. 
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in the design and implementation of an effective fishery management 
approach. 
B. The Hierarchical Model 
Under the hierarchical model, states act as regulators by setting and 
enforcing rules. For example, Canada and the United States have recently 
adopted the specific Halibut catch limits set forth by the International 
Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC).95 Specific catch shares subject fish-
ers to a high degree of monitoring, including onboard or dockside camer-
as, and oblige countries to report their fishing activities. 
Associations have improved the governance of fisheries by enhanc-
ing co-governance. Fishers have voluntarily self-organized into associa-
tions dedicated to maximizing fishers’ advocacy power and increasing 
their influence over countries’ regulatory decision-making. These associ-
ations make formal and informal representations to the regulators on be-
half of the fishers. These associations may also rally the fishers to sup-
port the regulators’ initiatives. The influence exerted by these associa-
tions adds an element of co-governance to a catch share regime, greatly 
improving the governability of the overall system. 
In a catch share regime, the regulator is the governing system, the 
fishers are the governed, and the administrative structures within the 
management scheme are the governing interactions. These administrative 
structures include: the quotas, the required licenses, the qualifications to 
apply for a quota, the markets on which quotas are traded, and the en-
forcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with these regula-
tions. The fishers’ association may also be a significant component of the 
GI. The regulatory requirements and enforcement mechanisms constrain 
day-to-day fishing activities. While intrusive, they are a marked im-
provement to the former system. 
Many of the catch share regimes today operate in developed coun-
tries where fisheries have been governed hierarchically, often with strict 
input controls, licensing limitations, or both. Before the introduction of 
ITQs, fishers were regulated by licensing requirements, limited fishing 
seasons, and gear restrictions. These fishers accept regulations as part of 
the fishing industry. They know how to comply and dispute regulatory 
decisions. Therefore, when ITQs were implemented, it was merely a 
change in approach to fishery management, not the introduction of regu-
lation where none had existed previously. 
                                                        
 95. See Pacific Halibut Fisheries; Catch Sharing Plan, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,423 (Mar. 15, 2013) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. 300), available at https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-06034. 
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Where there has been little to no regulation of fisheries, it will be 
difficult to impose controls on fishing. Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, both 
experts in the area of fisheries management, suggest that the success of 
co-management, co-governance structures is determined by the stake-
holders’ relationships before the shift in approach.96 In small-scale or 
traditional fisheries with little or no experience with regulation, ITQs 
will be very difficult to implement, because fishing regulations are new 
and complex, and fishers who have not been subjected to extensive regu-
lation may have difficulty understanding how to comply. While all coun-
tries could benefit from a more inclusive process when designing fishing 
regulations, countries where no regulation has existed before would ben-
efit the most. Including fishers in the regulation design process will min-
imize implementation and enforcement issues. 
Implementing ITQs in regions where SSFs make up the majority of 
the operating fisheries could cause these fisheries to fail. ITQs reward 
economic efficiency—the larger the catch, the greater the profit. Small-
scale fisheries do not have the capacity or resources to operate like large-
scale fisheries. Therefore, SSFs cannot compete with commercial fishers. 
Consequently, SSFs typically find it more profitable to sell their quotas 
to large fishers than to continue fishing because the cost for SSFs to fish 
the same quantity as commercial fishers is much higher. 
This type of “efficiency” poses a problem for countries where most 
fishers depend on small-scale fishing for their livelihood. The estimated 
number of people in the world who work in, or depend on, fisheries 
ranges from 30 million to 250 million people.97 ITQs could potentially 
displace enormous numbers of people who depend on those fisheries 
when small fishers are pressured or forced by the increased competition 
in the market to sell their ITQs to larger industrial interests. 
ITQs benefit large-scale, industrial fishing operators who enjoy 
lower administrative costs and greater profits. ITQs have been regarded 
as effective in developed countries, in part, because allocation based on 
ability to pay is an accepted distribution principle; in essence, the ability 
to pay has been accepted as sufficient justification for determining the 
distribution of ITQs.98 The needs are different in developing countries. 
These issues regularly lead scholars to argue that ITQs are not an appro-
priate form of management for traditional and small-scale fisheries, and 
                                                        
 96. Ratana Chuenpagdee & Svein Jentoft, Step Zero For Fisheries Co-Management: What 
Precedes Implementation, 31 MAR. POL’Y 657, 657–68 (2007). 
 97. Ratana Chuenpagdee et al., Challenges and Concerns in Capture Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture, in FISH FOR LIFE: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE FOR FISHERIES 25, 26 (J. Kooiman et al. eds., 
2005). 
 98. Id. 
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are therefore not suitable for most developing countries in the southern 
hemisphere. Given that the ITQ system fails to address a variety of situa-
tions where it has been applied around the world, it is unlikely that it will 
prove viable in the Arctic. In addition, given the vastly different chal-
lenges that face many of the states involved, an Arctic RFMO will be 
required for the states involved to coordinate properly to address these 
challenges. 
IV. APPLICATION 
 In order to ensure sustainable long-term availability of Arctic 
fish resources and engage the aboriginal communities, it is imperative 
that the interaction between governing systems and the governed be care-
fully studied. 
A. Hierarchical Governance and Governing Systems: What Resources 
are Available When Implementing Policies Affecting Small-Scale  
Fisheries? 
Intergovernmental organizations actively promote the interests of 
the Arctic people. The most prominent organization in managing Arctic 
fishing is the Arctic Council. 99  Created by a multilateral agreement 
signed by Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the Unit-
ed States of America, the Council grants full consultative status to six 
“Permanent Participants” representing groups of aboriginal people of the 
Arctic environment.100 These participants are organized as either national 
or cross-border associations of native peoples sharing a common cultural 
heritage and are further supported by an Indigenous Peoples Secretari-
at. 101  The Secretariat normally provides administrative support to the 
Permanent Participants, and acts as a medium, conveying information to 
                                                        
 99. Jennifer Jeffers, Climate Change and the Arctic: Adapting to Changes in Fisheries Stocks 
and Governance Regimes, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 917, 919 (2010). 
 100. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
(1996), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/history/107-
resources/about/history. The Arctic Council is chaired by each of its members in a rotating manner 
and new declarations capturing pressing issues and future directions are adopted every two years. Id. 
 101 . See Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants. The current six Permanent Participants 
are: Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) (http://www.arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/); Aleut Inter-
national Association (http://www.aleut-international.org/Page1.html); Gwich’in Council Internation-
al (http://www.gwichin.org); Inuit Circumpolar Council (http://www.inuit.org); Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) (http://www.raipon.info/novosti-sajta/); and the 
Saami Council (http://www.saamicouncil.net/?deptid=1116). 
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and from the communities.102 The Council remains open to add further 
Permanent Participants not exceeding the number of member states. 
The Permanent Participants are active at the Council’s regular and 
special meetings as well as in activities and programs run by the six 
working groups of the Council.103 Most notable, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Working Group (SDWG) conducts extensive assessments of lo-
cal socio-economic situations, traditional practices in the various com-
munities, and surveys of various community members. The SDWG also 
maintains a database to inform policy direction.104 In addition, the Partic-
ipants engage in ad hoc expert groups and task forces as mandated by the 
Council. While reports to the Council are welcomed, they do not become 
binding international law until they are signed by the member states.105 
For example, the Council recently reviewed a report detailing the im-
portance of the ecosystem-based management; however, it has not been 
adopted as binding.106 
The governing systems are as varied as the members of the Council. 
Each Arctic nation has its own history that heavily informs their method 
of fisheries management. In the United States, Arctic fisheries are man-
aged by the federal and state governments. For example, the National 
Marine Fishing Services, an office of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) approved the Fishery Management Plan 
for the Fish Resources of the Arctic Management Area, written under the 
authority of the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act.107 The Plan sets forth the scope of the U.S. Arctic waters and 
prohibits commercial fishing pending a future informed decision under 
the auspices of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. 108 
                                                        
 102 . For further information, see ARCTIC COUNCIL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ SECRETARIAT, 
http://www.arcticpeoples.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 103. See Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.arctic-council.org/ 
index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sustainable-development-working-group-sdwg/114-
resources/about/working-groups. 
 104. SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING GRP., ADAPTATION ACTIONS FOR A CHANGING ARCTIC (A) 
(2013) [hereinafter SDWG ADAPTION ACTIONS], available at http://www.sdwg.org/media.php? 
mid=1694; see also STATISTICS NORWAY, THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH 2008 (Solveig Glomsrød 
& Iulie Aslaksen eds., 2009), available at http://www.ssb.no/a/english/publikasjoner/pdf/sa112_en/ 
sa112_en.pdf. For further information and SDWG reports, see SDWG Project Reports, 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING GRP., http://www.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=23 (last visited Apr. 22, 
2014). 
 105. See SDWG ADAPTION ACTIONS, supra note 104. 
 106 . See generally EXPERT GRP. ON ECOSYSTEM-BASED MGMT., ECOSYSTEM-BASED 
MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC (2013), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/ 
document-archive/category/449-ebm. 
 107. N. PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES 
OF THE ARCTIC MANAGEMENT AREA (2009), available at http://www.npfmc.org/wp-
content/PDFdocuments/fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf. 
 108. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h) (2007). 
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NOAA maintains a comprehensive online database of publications from 
various governmental and non-governmental organizations, including 
those from Canada and other Arctic states.109 While NOAA has issued a 
number of reports on the effect of climate change in the Arctic, the effect 
of climate change specifically on Arctic indigenous people has yet to be 
studied.110 
At the state level, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
(ADF&G) manages commercial and private fishing. The Board of Fish-
eries is the governing body composed of seven politically appointed 
members who meet several times per year in the local communities to 
survey their opinions on future changes in regulation.111 In addition, the 
Board of Fisheries is authorized to set limits and issue fishing permits.112 
The Board has taken a sectoral approach to fisheries management, allo-
cating resources by species of fish and areas.113 
The Board is required to give subsistence fishing priority over all 
other uses of fish.114 Most communities dependent on Arctic fisheries 
qualify for subsistence permits. Subsistence fishing is defined as the 
“taking of, fishing for, or possession of fish, shellfish, or other fisheries 
resources by a resident of the state for subsistence uses with gillnet, seine, 
fish wheel, long line, or other means defined by the Board of Fisher-
ies.”115 While state law requires the provision of subsistence fishing, the 
Division of Subsistence, a division of the Alaskan government that re-
ports to the Board of Game and the Board of Fisheries, can conduct re-
search and inquiries into the application and impact of subsistence regu-
lations as well as make recommendations based on findings in partner-
ship with Alaskan communities.116 Lastly, the ADF&G maintains and 
                                                        
 109 . See, e.g., Arctic Report Card 2012, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 110. Full printable reports are available at Previous Editions of the Arctic Report Card, NAT’L 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard_previous.html (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 111. See Board of Fisheries, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/ 
index.cfm?adfg=fisheriesboard.main (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME, 2013–2016 ALASKA PENINSULA, ATKA-
AMLIA ISLANDS, AND ALEUTIAN ISLAND AREAS COMMERCIAL SALMON FISHING REGULATIONS 47 
(2013), available at http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/regulations/fishregulations/pdfs/commercial/ 
akpen-2013-2016.pdf. 
 114. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1998) (stating “[i]f a portion of a stock or population can be 
harvested consistent with sustained yield, the board shall determine the amount of the harvestable 
portion that is reasonably necessary for subsistence uses”). 
 115. Memorandum from Alpheus Bullard on Legislative Affairs Agency of the State of Alaska 
to Representative Tammie Wilson (Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/ 
regulations/regprocess/pdfs/jbmeetings/2013-10-12/rcs/rc035_AOC_Cleaner_Copy_of_partial_ 
PC13.pdf. 
 116. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.094 (1978). 
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makes available a comprehensive database of socio-economic infor-
mation on local communities, including even the smallest and most re-
mote communities in the Arctic.117 
While Alaska has acted to protect subsistence fishing, the federal 
government has also had a hand in protecting subsistence needs in Alas-
ka. In 1980, Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser-
vation Act (ANILCA) giving rural Alaskan residents a priority for sub-
sistence fishing. To manage subsistence farming, the Secretaries of the 
Interior and Agriculture established the Federal Subsistence Management 
program to enforce subsistence farming priorities on federally owned 
lands.118   
Current federal regulations also take a sectoral management ap-
proach, dividing the regulated areas by zone of interest. The U.S. De-
partment of the Interior publishes an informative guide on these regula-
tions available to any interested person.119 Like the ADG&F, the federal 
agency partners with scientists, local communities, or private contractors 
to collect subsistence harvest information and local trends, along with 
knowledge of resource preservation.120  Additionally, the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior provides its community partners with funding to 
conduct these projects.121 
                                                        
 117. The database consists of a Community Subsistence Harvest Information System (CSIS) 
and a Technical Papers and Special Publication Series. See Subsistence in Alaska, ALASKA DEP’T OF 
FISH AND GAME, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?ADFG=subsistence.harvest (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2014). 
 118. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 
(1980) (codified in part at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3133 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and in scattered sec-
tions of Titles 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43). For a historic review of enactment, see Richard J. Fink, 
The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 119. See OFFICE OF SUBSISTENCE MGMT., SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS FOR 
THE HARVEST OF FISH AND SHELLFISH ON FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS AND WATERS IN ALASKA (2013), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/subsistence/regulation/fish_shell/upload/entireFishRegbook.pdf. 
 120. See generally Fisheries Monitoring Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, available at 
http://www.doi.gov/subsistence/library/monitor_fish/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 121 . See, Partners of Fisheries Monitoring, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, available at 
http://www.doi.gov/subsistence/monitor/partners/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
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B. Hierarchical Governance and Governing Interactions 
What are the various forms, frequencies, and instruments used to interact 
with small-scale fisheries? What is the legitimacy associated with the 
normative orders? Besides imposing different forms of regulation and 
collecting data on subsistence, what other instruments are there? Are 
community development quotas such an instrument? 
Before interest in subsistence fishing surged, most Arctic popula-
tions were rarely surveyed. Such surveys have improved researchers’ 
understanding of various populations’ involvement with the creation of 
fisheries regulations and response to the enforcement of such regulations. 
A survey sponsored by the Arctic Council, in collaboration with several 
of its Permanent Participants, found that Alaskan aboriginal populations 
are reporting the highest possible satisfaction with the system governing 
local food sources.122 While fishing was reportedly the most often em-
ployed mode of subsistence, only Alaskan Inupiat and Greenland popula-
tions reported ability to influence the management of their fish and game, 
as well as reduce environmental degradation.123 The survey has been 
lauded as a first initiative to truly measure the subsistence “incomes” of 
aboriginal people.124 The surveys were designed to measure well-being 
through factors such as GDP, employment income, and census data.125 
Although aboriginal populations gain part of their income from seasonal 
employment, their main income is derived from harvesting the food re-
sources of the lands and waters they inhabit. Cash earned through their 
employment is then invested in acquisition or improvement of the har-
vesting equipment. This reinvestment of capital in the ability to harvest is 
the foundation of a subsistence economy. 
In fact, some have argued that in the aboriginal North, the subsist-
ence economy is a system that is intertwined with a cash economy and 
serves as a “sponge, absorbing labor when other opportunities decline, 
                                                        
 122. For a detailed overview of results, see generally Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic: 
Inuit, Saami, and the Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka, SURVEY OF LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE 
ARCTIC, http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 123. SURVEY OF LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE ARCTIC, LESSONS LEARNED (Birger Poppel ed., 
2011), available at http://www.sdwg.org/media.php?mid=1203. 
 124. BIRGER POPPEL & JACK KRUSE, THE IMPORTANCE OF A MIXED CASH- AND HARVEST 
HERDING BASED ECONOMY TO LIVING IN THE ARCTIC (2009), reprinted in QUALITY OF LIFE AND 
THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE: ADVANCES IN QUALITY-OF-LIFE STUDIES, THEORY AND RESEARCH 
27 (Valerie Møller & Dennis Huscka eds., 2009), available at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10. 
1007%2F978-1-4020-8569-7_4. 
 125. Id. 
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and releasing it when they arise.”126 This relationship places the house-
hold at the center of the subsistence economy. Income entering the 
household takes the form of cash from employment (i.e., seasonal or 
permanent), sales of commodities (e.g., fur, fish, etc.), and transfer pay-
ments (i.e., government assured payments).127 On the other hand, there is 
also in-kind income from subsistence production obtained through har-
vesting land and water, employing the household labor skills, and utiliz-
ing the household capital.128 In the end, the entire unit is focused on sur-
vival and the well-being of the community.129 A household engages in 
extensive sharing rather than acting simply for its own benefit.130 
C. Co-Governance and Governing Systems 
Are government institutions open to cooperation and sharing of power 
and responsibility? How has experience informed interactions and rela-
tionships? 
The governing approach to food resources in Alaska is one of im-
position, like the system in the Arctic. The government uses scientific 
data to inform policy and laws which are then imposed onto the local 
communities via enforcement mechanisms. This type of governance is 
typical according to a recent interim report published by the Arctic 
Council, though it is identified as “scientific management.”131 The report 
also emphasizes the hierarchical character of this governance method.132 
Although Alaska’s hierarchical governance system ensures adequate re-
sources for aboriginal populations, it fails to take into account numerous 
community-specific norms, practices, and local knowledge.133 
Although Alaska’s governance mechanisms inform themselves 
from the community level (e.g., through state and federal funding of re-
searchers and interested organizations, and community meetings with the 
state Board of Fisheries), it is not clear whether these interactions amount 
to co-governance. Various scholars have characterized the concept of 
“co-governance” differently. Co-governance has been defined as incor-
                                                        
 126. Peter J. Usher et al., The Household as an Economic Unit in Arctic Aboriginal Communi-
ties, and Its Measurement by Means of a Comprehensive Survey, 61 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 175, 178 
(2003), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1021344707027. 
 127. Id. at 180. 
 128. Id. at 181. 
 129. Id. at 184. 
 130. Id. 
 131. ARCTIC COUNCIL ET AL., ARCTIC RESILIENCE INTERIM REPORT 2013 85 (2013), available 
at http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/ArcticResilienceInterim 
Report2013-HighRes.pdf . 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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porating the socio-cultural values of the community, perhaps even result-
ing in a decentralization of management. 134  In other instances, co-
governance has been distinguished from “consultative management,” a 
form of management of fisheries where the population is consulted—
their opinion is ostensibly sought—but the population is ultimately una-
ble to exercise any real power in the decision-making process. 135  In 
North America, co-governance revolves around the cooperation between 
the government and indigenous groups—for example, to manage a spe-
cies of fish.136 This cooperation includes formal and informal decision-
making, and occurs through collection of data and analysis, allocation of 
resources, and issuance of regulation.137 Yet, as mentioned above, co-
governance fails to incorporate the local aboriginal experience and social 
values. 
D. Co-Governance and Governing Interactions 
Has collaboration resulted in trustful interactions, mutual understanding, 
and high compliance? Has there been any co-production knowledge in-
forming decision-making? 
It remains unclear the extent to which collaboration between gov-
ernment and aboriginal communities has resulted in co-determined deci-
sions. At least one Alaskan study reported the existence of co-ops that 
monitor and collect data on particular species.138 Note, however, that the-
se efforts produce knowledge on a single species. For example, the Arc-
tic Borderlands Ecological Knowledge Co-op monitors changes in the 
range of the Porcupine Caribou Herd and adjacent coastal and marine 
areas.139 The co-op is partly funded by both United States and Canadian 
agencies, but the co-op does not report whether the data is used by the 
funding agencies in their decision-making.140 The trend to produce spe-
                                                        
 134. See Anthony Davis, Social Research and Alternative Approaches to Fisheries Manage-
ment: An Introductory Comment, 9 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 233, 233–36 (1996). 
 135. Bonnie J. McCay & Svein Jentoft, From the Bottom Up: Participatory Issues in Fisheries 
Management, 9 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 237, 239 (1996). 
 136. Bruce C. Forbes & Florian Stammler, Arctic Climate Change Discourse: The Contrasting 
Politics of Research Agendas in the West and Russia, 28 POLAR RES. 28, 32 (2009). 
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 138. Gary Kofinas et al., Community Contributions to Ecological Monitoring: Knowledge Co-
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cies-specific knowledge is predominant in North American governing 
systems.141 
University-established organizations are another source of research 
and data collection. For example, the Alaska Native Knowledge Network 
(ANKN) serves as a platform to compile and exchange information be-
tween interested actors regarding a diverse range of topics relevant to 
indigenous life, including the subsistence lifestyle.142 In fact, its subsist-
ence-relevant resources contain a reference to a Subsistence Management 
Information program of United Fishermen of Alaska.143 These tools help 
to inform fishermen about the differences between federal and state man-
agement systems. One tool is a list of opportunities to get involved in 
decision-making, such as submitting management proposals, comments, 
and testimony for consideration in Regional Advisory Council meetings 
or to the Federal Subsistence Board; the list also includes information 
about running for a seat on the Regional Advisory Council, which re-
serves 70% of its seats for subsistence interests.144 Nevertheless, it is ap-
parent that decision-making is not accessible to the regular indigenous 
citizen. Opportunities to participate are constrained by a hierarchical, 
bureaucratic governance system that is a scientifically informed institu-
tion. While it is questionable to what extent the ANKN effectuates co-
governance, it hosts an impressive collection of resources and has en-
gaged in community education through traditional knowledge and culture. 
Co-governance with an RFMO has not yet been attempted, but the 
systems that currently exist and the research discussed immediately 
above suggest that it could provide a drastic improvement over the cur-
rent system. By involving the local populations in Arctic management, 
greater compliance may be achieved. Co-governing with an RFMO will 
help to coordinate the visions and policy initiatives pursued by the vari-
ous Arctic states. Such coordination will improve the level of communi-
cation between states and the extent of data and information sharing, and 
will hopefully result in a coordinated effort to manage the natural re-
sources in the Arctic. As discussed above, individual efforts to regulate 
Arctic fisheries can only achieve so much. An Arctic-dedicated RFMO 
would provide the necessary forum to bring stakeholders together, in-
cluding smaller communities, such as the aboriginals, that have typically 
been excluded from the regulatory creation and implementation process. 
                                                        
 141. See Forbes & Stammler, supra note 136. 
 142. For more information, see Indigenous Knowledge Systems, ALASKA NATIVE KNOWLEDGE 
NETWORK (May 23, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://ankn.uaf.edu/IKS/Iceberg.html. 
 143. See generally Informing Alaskans, SUBSISTENCE MGMT. INFO., http:// 
www.subsistmgtinfo.org/index.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
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(last updated Jan. 30, 2007). 
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V. MOVING TOWARDS CO-GOVERNANCE 
This paper advocates the transition of the Regional Fisheries Man-
agement Organization (RFMO) from its classic form into a more interac-
tive and collaborative mechanism. While the North Atlantic RFMO has 
achieved collaboration between countries, these collaborations have 
failed to include important communities, such as the aboriginals, who are 
greatly affected by decisions regarding the management of fisheries.145 In 
order to ensure that all important stakeholders are engaged in fisheries 
management, it is imperative that an Arctic-dedicated RFMO be estab-
lished that not only brings about collaboration between Arctic countries, 
but engages and involves the aboriginals. 
The Arctic-dedicated RFMO should incorporate principles from the 
Interactive Governance Approach (IGA) and the Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries (EAF) models. Specifically, an RFMO can be created using an 
interactive governance model, thereby addressing the shortcomings of 
the RFMO model.146  Arctic countries would be member-states to the 
RFMO and would be required to engage with coastal communities—
arguably the communities most affected by decisions regarding fisheries 
management. The governance structure would ensure that the unique in-
sights of aboriginal communities would be gathered and that their inter-
ests and concerns would be responded to. Furthermore, Arctic fisheries 
would be managed on the basis of ecosystems, taking into account that 
catch quotas should be used to prevent overfishing of sought-after fish 
stocks. This model would better protect fish stocks and facilitate more 
constructive coordination between fishing nations. Because all the stake-
holders would be engaged in the regulatory development and implemen-
tation process, there would be greater compliance with fishing regula-
tions because they would be responsive to everyone’s needs while ensur-
ing the sustainability of fish stocks, and the rules would actually be un-
derstood by the regulated parties. Rather than being an imposed, hierar-
chical system, this model would seek out and utilize the knowledge of 
aboriginals and encourage the operation of small-scale fisheries (SSFs), 
which are invested in the protection of fisheries for future generations 
rather than mere profit-maximization. 
Applying an RFMO to the European nations will be a difficult task. 
Collaboration between European states has been non-existent to weak at 
best.147 To change this, European leaders will need to use RFMOs to en-
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gage countries and facilitate coordination between stakeholders. 148 
RFMOs can be used to effectively bring about legitimate and substantial 
change if the states involved have the political will and economic capital 
to do so.149 Canada and the United States, by contrast, historically have 
close working ties that could translate well into the establishment of a 
new RFMO. However, given the United States’ history of ratification of 
fisheries-related international treaties, the United States may resist be-
coming a non-voluntary member of an RFMO with Canada. Hopefully, 
all countries will see the benefit to being an engaged member in the 
RFMO development process. 
To encourage collaboration, co-governance should become the 
model for fisheries management. Nevertheless, in bringing more stake-
holders into the conversation, the structure must ensure that the decision-
making process does not become burdened by the greater number of par-
ties involved. The co-governance model consolidated with an RFMO is 
the ideal scenario for addressing the challenges the Arctic faces. Even if 
a co-governance approach is not adopted, the establishment of an Arctic 
RFMO is critical to better developing the regime as needed to address the 
Arctic challenges. The challenges facing the Arctic are unique, and an 
RFMO dedicated to the Arctic is necessary to bring about collaboration 
between affected states and to effectuate the necessary management 
changes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What we can see from these comparisons is that the RFMO system 
is likely to be much more effective when coupled with interactive and 
ecosystem-sensitive fisheries management approaches. Rights-based 
schemes are unlikely to be an improvement over the current RFMO sys-
tem.150 Though RFMOs have shortcomings, they represent a drastic im-
provement from the current void of an international regulatory body. The 
alternative systems proposed here could be much more effective at deal-
ing with the social and sustainability issues facing these fisheries. 
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States must collaborate with other states; they must exchange sci-
ence and data and work together to create enforcement mechanisms. The 
more consistency there is across systems of fisheries management, the 
greater the chance such regulations will be understood and complied with 
worldwide. 
Fisheries management approaches must recognize the human di-
mension to fishing, and both the effect that the health and well-being of 
the ecosystem as a whole has on fishing, and the effect fishing has on the 
health and well-being of the ecosystem. The Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization’s SSFs guidelines demonstrate how fishing regulations can 
protect the interests and livelihood of fishers with fewer resources and 
treat the fishery as part of a greater, complex ecosystem. Furthermore, 
fisheries management must include elements of co-governance, and re-
spect communities as well as SSFs. Certain communities, such as those 
of the aboriginals, view fishing as a way of life, and management struc-
tures must capture that. Lastly, RFMOs must be responsive to the needs 
of fishers and protect fisheries as a present and future source of liveli-
hood. 
